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PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENTS
The articles of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure on this
subject were advisedly couched in broad and general language.
".... [P]ersonal jurisdiction over nonresidents is an area
of the procedural law in which many of the old landmarks
have been uprooted by recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, where the law is still in somewhat of a
state of flux, and in which no one may delineate its future
limitations with any degree of assurance or precision. For
these reasons, the Louisiana State Law Institute advisedly
adopted a basic article with language broad enough to pro-
vide an adequate theoretical foundation for implementing
legislation, but which would not have to be amended con-
stantly to keep abreast of expanding constitutional limits
of full faith and credit and due process of law. .... ."
Even prior to 1960, Louisiana had a number of special stat-
utes which enabled its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents. 2 Further, one of the most important pieces
of legislation implementing the new procedural Code8 was
adopted, on the recommendation of the Law Institute, to permit
Louisiana to tap the full potential of personal jurisdiction over
foreign corporations4 now allowed by the United States Supreme
Court.5 However, at the time of the adoption of the new pro-
*Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. McMahon, Jurisdiction under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 35
TuL. L. REV. 501, 507 (1961).
2. These included the Nonresident Motorist Act, LA. R.S. 13:3474 and
13:3475 (1950) ; the Foreign Watercraft Act, id. 13:3479 through 13:3482; the
Direct Action Statute, id. 22:655; pertinent provisions of the Louisiana Insur-
ance Code, id. 22:982(2), 22:985, and 22:1253(A) ; and certain statutory pro-
visions relating to foreign corporations, id. 12:202, and id. 13 :3471(5) (c, d)
prior to amendment in 1960.
3. LA. R.S. 13:3471(1) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 1.
4. The former LA. R.S. 13:3471(5) (d) (1950) provided for the service of
process on foreign corporations not required to appoint an agent for the service
of process in Louisiana, in actions resulting from or related to "business activities
in this state through acts performed by its employees or agents in this state."
In 1960, this was broadened by substituting the words "a business activity in
this state" for the more limited language quoted above. LA. R.S. 13:3471.(1),
as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 1.
5. "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in pereonam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
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cedural Code there was still a hiatus with respect to personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents. Here, "the Achilles' heel of Lou-
isiana civil procedure [was] jurisdiction in personam over non-
resident individuals and partnerships."" The effect of this hiatus
made itself evident almost immediately.,
There were two reasons why the Reporters on the Code of
Civil Procedure Project did not submit the draft of any imple-
menting statute at the time of the adoption of the new Code.
Firstly, they did not have the time to complete the necessary
study of such legislation. Secondly, a number of other states
were drafting such statutes at the time. A relatively slight delay
would provide Louisiana with the opportunity of studying these
statutes and their experience in the state and federal courts.
By the middle of 1962, the Commission on International
Rules of Judicial Procedure had completed its draft of the pro-
posed Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, s and
on August 3, 1962, this draft was approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. This
uniform statute contained complete provisions covering personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents, 9 based largely upon the recently
adopted "long arm statutes" of fifteen states.10
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), quoted with approval
in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
6. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term-
Civil Procedure, 24 LA. L. REV. 291, 293 (1964).
7. In De Marcy v. Keystone Exploration Co., 137 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1961-1962 Term - Civil Procedure, 23 LA. L. REV. 378, 379 (1963), and Con-
solidated Credit Corp. v. Johnston, 152 So. 2d 399 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963),
discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term
- Civil Procedure, 24 LA. L. REV. 291, 294 (1964) ; cf. Gaudin v. Cunningham,
164 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
8. See Fourth Annual Pzport of the Commission on International Rules of
Judicial Procedure, U.S. H.R. Doe. No. 88 (1963).
9. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act arts. I and II.
10. Illinois: ILL. ANN. STATS. C. 110, § 117 (Smith-Hurd 1961); Maine:
ME. REV. STATS. c. 112, § 21 (1960 Supp.) ; Maryland: MD. CODE art. 23, § 92
(1957); Michigan: MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.715, 27A.725, 27A.735 (1961
Supp.); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (1962 Supp.) ; Montana: MONT.
REV. Civ. PROC. 4B(1) (e) (1962 Supp.); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 300:11 (1962 Supp.); New York: N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (1) (1962
Supp.) ; North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-145 (Repl. 1962) ; Penn-
.sylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. C. 1, tit. 12, § 331 (1962 Supp.) ; Tennessee: TENN.
CODE ANN. § 20-220 (1962 Supp.); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN.. tit. 12, § 855
.(1962 Supp.) ; Washington: WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185 (1957) ; Wisconsin:
WiS. STAT. tit. 25, § 262.05 (Cum. Supp. 1962) ; Wyoming: WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-44 (1962 Supp.).
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• The Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Statute adopted
by the Legislature of Louisiana in 1964,1" on the recommenda-
tion of the Law Institute, is based largely on the pertinent pro-
visions of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act. Actually the only changes made were the substitution of
civilian terminology for the Anglo-American nomenclature of
the uniform act,12 the inclusion of a definition of "nonresident"
as employed in the Louisiana legislation,"s the insertion of a
venue rule, 14 the addition of specific provisions for service of
process outside of Louisiana,1 5 and the specific inclusion of "a
real right" in the language relating to an interest in, use, or
possession of real property in this state. 6
The initial section' 7 of the new Louisiana "long arm statute"
contains the grant of jurisdiction over nonresidents in the fol-
lowing language:
"A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of
action arising from the nonresident's
11. LA. R.S. 13:3201 through 13:3207 (1950), added by La. Acts 1964, No.
47, § 3.
12. The language "injury or damage by an offense or quasi offense" was sub-
stituted in LA. R.S. 13:3201 (1950), added by La. Acts 1964, No. 47, § 3, for
the words "tortious injury" of Section 1.03 of the uniform act.
13. Section 1.03 of the uniform act uses the word "person," with an extreme-
ly broad definition of the latter set out in section 1.01. LA. R.S. 13:3201 and
13:3202 (1950), added by La. Acts 1964, No. 47, § 3, substitute therefor the
word "nonresident," which is defined in id. 13:3206, as including "an individual,
his executor, administrator, or other legal representative, who at the time of the
filing of the suit is not domiciled or residing in this state, or a partnership, asso-
ciation, or any other legal or commercial entity (other than a corporation) not
then domiciled in this state, or a corporation which is not organized under the
laws of, and is not then licensed to do business in, this state."
14. "A suit on a cause of action described in R.S. 13:3201 may be instituted
in the parish where the plaintiff is domiciled, or in any parish of proper venue
under any provision of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure other than Article
42." LA. R.S. 13:3203 (1950), added by La. Acts 1964, No. 47, § 3. LA. CODE
OF CIVIL PRocEDuRE art. 42 (1960) was excepted so as to exclude specifically any
implication that the defendant might be sued in any parish in the state.
15. LA. R.S. 13:3204 (1950), added by La. Acts 1964, No. 47, § 3, provides
the modes for the service of process on the nonresident defendant outside of the
state.
16. Section 1.03 (a) (5) of the uniform act refers to "having an interest in,
using, or possessing real property in this state." In the Louisiana legislation this
is changed to "having an interest in, using, or possessing a real right or im-
movable property in this state." LA. R.S. 13:3201(e) (1950), added by La. Acts
1964, No. 47, § 3. In the vast majority of cases, suits involving mineral inter-
ests are proceedings in rem, of which the district court of the parish where the
property is situated has jurisdiction. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PaocanuR arts. 8,
80(1) (1960). The words "a real right" were added so as to remove any doubt
as to the jurisdiction in personam of the Louisiana court in personal actions in-
volving a real right, as defined by id. art. 3664.
17. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (1950), added by La. Acts 1964, No. 47, § 3.
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"(a) transacting any business in this state;
"(b) contracting to supply services or things in this
state;
"(c) causing injury or damage by an offense or quasi
offense committed through an act or omission in this state;
"(d) causing injury or damage in this state by an of-
fense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission
outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business,
or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered, in this state; or
"(e) having an interest in, using, or possessing a real
right or immovable property in this state."
The Louisiana legislation follows the uniform act in ex-
pressly prohibiting the joinder of a cause of action over which
the court does not have jurisdiction in personam with a cause of
action falling within the section quoted just above.'8 This may
not have been necessary, as the probabilities are that the same
result would follow under the code rules of cumulation of ac-
tions.'
Service of process, under this statute, may be made either
by registered or certified mail, or by personal delivery by a
person designated by the Louisiana court or by one authorized
by the law of the places where the service is made to serve the
process of any of its courts of general jurisdiction.20 The rights
of the nonresident defendant are protected by a statutory pro-
hibition against a default judgment earlier than thirty days
after proof of service has been filed in the record.21 The final
section of the statute declares that it provides additional rem.-
18. Id. 13:3202.
19. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 462 and 463 (1960), requiring that
each of the plural actions cumulated be "within the jurisdiction of the court."
20. LA. R.S. 13:3204 (1950), added by La. Acts 1964, No. 47, § 3.
21. "No default judgment can be rendered against the defendant until thirty
days after the filing in the record of the affidavit of the individual who either:
"(a) mailed the process to the defendant. showing that it was enclosed in an
envelope properly addressed to the defendant, with sufficient postage affixed,
and the date it was deposited in the United States mails, to which shall be at-
tached the return receipt of the defendant; or
"(b) actually delivered the process to the defendant, showing the date, place,




edies and does not in any way conflict with, modify, or repeal
any code or statutory provision providing another remedy.22
With the adoption of the Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-
residents Statute, it is believed that the courts of Louisiana
now possess all of the jurisdiction in personam over all types
of nonresidents permitted by the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court.
Two other changes were made in Title 13 of the Revised
Statutes in 1964. The first of these provided an alternative
mode for the service of garnishment process on a nonresident
individual doing business in Louisiana.2 3 The second amended
the provision governing the application for a rehearing in the
intermediate courts of appeal, so as to avoid conflict with a
recent amendment of their uniform rules.2 4
PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE
Ever since the decisions in Williams v. North Carolina,'
when a husband establishes a domicile in another state or coun-
try he may obtain a valid divorce there, even though the court
has no jurisdiction in personam over the wife. In such instances,
if the wife subsequently sued the husband in Louisiana for a
divorce or separation from bed and board, the divorce granted
to the husband in the other state or country would be a com-
plete defense to the wife's action.2 6 Further, under the law prior
22.."R.S. 13:3201 through 13:3206 provide additional remedies, and do not
in any way affect, conflict with, modify, or repeal any code article or statute
providing any other remedy, including without being limited to, any of the pro-
visions of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, R.S. 13:3471(1), R.S. 13:3472,
R.S. 13:3474 and 13:3475, R.S. 13:3479 through 13:3482, R.S. 13:3914, or R.S.
22:655." LA. R.S. 13:3207 (1950), added by La Acts 1964, No. 47, § 3.
23. LA. R.S. 13:3914 (1950), added by La. Acts 1964, No. 47, §4, providing
that if the nonresident garnishee is absent from his place of business at the time
of the attempted service of the garnishment process, it may be served on any of
his agents or employees. This change was made to fill in the hiatus indicated
by Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Johnston, 152 So. 2d 399 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1963), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-
1963 Term - Civil Procedure, 24 LA. L. REv. 291, 293, 294 (1964).
24. LA. R.S. 13:4446(B) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 47, § 5,
to conform to, and avoid any conflict with, Rule XI, § 2, Uniform Rules of the
Louisiana Courts of Appeal, as amended in 1963. Both provide that an applica-
tion for rehearing must be filed, or properly mailed to the court in an envelope
officially postmarked on or before the fourteenth calendar day after notice of
judgment has been given.
25. 317 U.S. 287 (1942), noted 17 TUL. L. REv. 500 (1943) and id. 325 U.S.
226 (1945), noted 6 LA. L. REv. 290 (1945).
26. Such a situation was actually presented in Walker v. Walker, 157 So. 2d
476 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), but the question of the plaintiff wife's right to
alimony was foreclosed by the fact that she had not been free of fault.
[Vol. XXV
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to 1964, the court would have been without power to grant the
wife alimony, even if she had been without fault. To fill in this
lacuna, some of the states have adopted statutes which au-
thorize their courts to grant alimony to the wife in such cases.
2 7
On the recommendation of the Law Institute, at its last session
the legislature amended article 160 of the Civil Code primarily
for the purpose of filling in this hiatus.2 8  Another effect of
this amendment is to make it clear that, regardless of who ob-
tains the divorce, the wife is not entitled to alimony unless she
has been free of fault.29
The same statute expressly repealed articles 412 and 413 of
the Civil Code, both of which had been repealed impliedly by
the Code of Civil Procedure. °
AMENDMENTS OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Seventeen articles of the new procedural Code were amended
in 1964. Of this number, fifteen of the changes were made on
27. E.g., 6A GILBERT-BLISS, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 1170-b (1956 Cum. Supp.),
which was held constitutional in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
28. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 160 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 48,§ 1.
29. This amendment made it clear, through the inclusion of the words "when
the wife has not been at fault" in the preamble, that the wife who obtains the
divorce is not entitled to alimony unless she has been without fault. LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 160 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 48, § 1. When this
code article was adopted in 1870, no divorce could be granted unless the plaintiff
was free of fault. Then followed the statute providing that living separate and
apart for seven years (eventually shortened to two years) entitled either of the
spouses to a divorce. A history of the prior amendments to article 160 is to be
found in August v. Blache, 200 La. 1029, 1034-36, 9 So. 2d 402, 403-04 (1942).
In Sachse v. Sachse, 150 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), it was held that
even when the wife obtains the divorce she must prove her freedom from fault
to obtain alimony. See, to substantially the same effect, McKnight v. Irving,
228 La. 1088, 85 So. 2d 1 (1956). However, there appears to be a contrary hold-
ing in Moreau v. Moreau, 142 So. 2d 423, 426 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), weakened
to some extent by the fact that the intermediate appellate court found as a fact
that the wife was free of fault. Id. at 426, 427. See also the concurring opinion
of McCaleb, J., in McKnight v. Irving, supra. So, unless the wife's freedom from
fault was made applicable to all three subdivisions of the amended article, this
amendment probably would have been construed as a legislative overruling of
Sachse v. Sachse, supra. The I.aw Institute and the legislature considered the
holding of the latter to be the sounder policy.
The second subdivision of the amended article was broadened to include a
divorce under LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 31, § 1,
to avoid any contention that its rule regarding alimony was impliedly repealed
through this amendment.
30. La. Acts 1964, No. 48, § 2. The former LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 412 and
413 (1870), respectively, granted the husband an absolute right to be appointed
curator of his interdicted wife and relieved the wife of the necessity of furnish-
ing security when she was appointed curatrix of her husband. These articles had
been repealed impliedly by LA. CODE OF CIWL PROCEDURE arts. 4131, 4550, and
4554 (1960), which accorded each spouse only a priority of appointment to the
curatorship of the interdict if asserted within ten days of the interdiction, and
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the recommendation of the Law Institute. 31 The remaining two
amendments resulted from the initiative of individual legis-
lators.32
In the two sets of amendments of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure recommended heretofore by the Law Institute,33 the larger
number were adopted to fill in hiatuses which had been discov-
ered by the Law Institute during the two years following the
adoption of the new Code. In 1964, this emphasis shifted, as
only two of the Institute recommendations were made for that
purpose. Five articles were recommended for amendment sole-
ly for the purpose of clarification, without any change in the
procedural law actually being made. Ten articles of the new
Code were amended on the recommendation of the Law Institute
to effect changes in the law, primarily to meet changing social
and economic conditions.
Probably the most serious of the two procedural hiatuses
filled in by 1964 legislation was pointed out (if not created) in
State v. Hillebrandt,34 holding that a party litigating in forma
pauperis was not relieved of the necessity of paying the fees,
mileage, and expenses of the witnesses whom he subpoenaed to
testify at the trial. The 1964 amendment works a legislative
overruling of this case. 5
The second hiatus was created during the redaction of the
new procedural Code. The provisions of R.S. 13:3411 and
13:3412, authorizing the appointment of an attorney at law
to represent the unrepresented defendant in proceedings in rem,
further required the wife to furnish security when appointed curatrix of her
interdicted husband.
31. By La. Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1, amending LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
arts. 1114, 2088, 2416, 2592, 2637, 2642, 3097, 3098, 3191, 4034, 4234, 4264, 4273,
5091, and 5185 (1960).
32. La. Acts 1964, No. 483, § 1, and La. Acts 1964, No. 336, § 1, amending
LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3782 and 5181 (1960), respectively.
33. See La. Acts 1961, No. 23, § 1, and La. Acts 1962, No. 92, § 1, discussed
in Louisiana Legislation of 1962: A Symposium - Civil Procedure, 23 LA. L. REV.
56 (1962). These amendments are analyzed in The Work of the Louisiana Appel-
late Courts for the 1962-1963 Term - Civil Procedure, 24 LA. L. REV. 291
(1964).
34. 244 La. 742, 154 So. 2d 384 (1963), affirming id., 146 So. 2d 718 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1962). These decisions are criticized in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term - Civil Procedure, 24 LA. L. REV. 291,
324-326 (1964).
35. By entitling the indigent party to: "(2) The right to the compulsory
attendance of witnesses for the purpose of testifying, either in court or by deposi-
tion, without the payment of the fees, mileage, and other expenses allowed these
witnesses by law . . . ." LA. CODE OF CxVIL PROCEDURE art. 5185 (1960), as
amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1.
[Vol. XXV
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were repealed in 196036 under the erroneous impression that
they had been transferred to the new procedural Code. Actually,
they had been transferred to the Title on Executory Proceed-
ings37 (where they were needed most often), but had not been
retained with respect to ordinary proceedings in rem (where
they were needed occasionally). Article 5091 was amended in
1964 so as to restore the former Revised Statute provisions
completely.-
Of the three code provisions clarified by 1964 amendments,
the most important is article 2088. This provision originally
was declaratory of the general jurisprudential rule that the
jurisdiction of the trial court is divested, and that of the' ap-
pellate court attaches, on the filing of the appeal bond, or on
the signing of the order of appeal if no bond is required by law.
However, some of the exceptions to this general rule recog-
nized by the prior jurisprudence were not stated in this article,
and could only be found in other provisions of the new Code.
The 1964 amendment merely re-writes this article, phrases the
general rule more precisely, and includes all of the exceptions
thereto.3 9
The fifteen-day delay allowed for the taking of a suspensive
appeal from an order of seizure and sale in an executory pro-
ceeding, like other delays for an appeal, was tied in with the
delay for applying for a new trial.40 However, in an executory
proceeding no new trial may be applied for. A court would have
experienced no particular difficulty in concluding that, in view
of this, the delay ran from the date of the signing of the order
for the issuance of the writ, but this would have necessitated
a review of the history of the pertinent article and its source
provisions. The 1964 amendment clarifies the article by provid-
36. By La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 2.
37. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2674 (1960).
38. "The court shall appoint an attorney at law to represent the defendant,
on the petition or ex parte written motion of the plaintiff, when: . * *
"(2) The action or proceeding is in rem, and: (a) the defendant is dead, no
succession representative has been appointed, and his heirs and legatees have not
been sent into possession judicially; (b) the defendant is a corporation or part-
nership on which process cannot be served for any reason; or (c) the defendant's
property is under the administration of a legal representative, but the latter has
died, resigned, or been removed from office and no successor thereof has quali-
fied, or has left the state permanently without appointing someone to represent
him. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 5091 (1960), as amended by La.
Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1.
39. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2088 (1960), as amended by La. Acts
1964, No. 4, § 1.
40. id. art. 2642.
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ing expressly that a "suspensive appeal from an order directing
the issuance of a writ of seizure and sale shall be taken within
fifteen days of the signing of the order. '41
The third clarifying amendment merely substitutes express
authority for the implied power of a succession representative,
resident or nonresident, to appoint an agent to represent him
in all acts of his administration during his absence.42
Of those amendments made to meet changed, or changing,
social or economic conditions, the most important were in the
field of tutorship. Under the new procedural Code, as under
the prior law, a nonresident was disqualified from appointment
as tutor of a Louisiana minor; and if he were a resident at the
time of such an appointment, he forfeited the office by aban-
doning his Louisiana residence. 43 A century and a half ago,
when a person seldom strayed more than a few miles from the
place of his birth, these were probably workable rules; but in
view of the present migratory practices of the American people,
and of modern, efficient means of transportation and communi-
cation, these rules have become both anachronistic and unwork-
able. They were discarded in 1964 through the amendment of
four separate code articles. 44 A nonresident may now be ap-
pointed the tutor of a Louisiana minor, and he no longer for-
feits his office by moving out of the state. The only require-
ment imposed on him which is not required of a resident is that
he appoint a resident agent for the service of process, and file
this appointment in the tutorship proceeding. 45 These new rules
apply likewise to curatorship.4
Both building and loan,47 and federal savings and loan, 48
associations for some years have been permitted to enforce
their mortgages by executory process even though they also
secured advances made to the mortgagor for the payment of
taxes, insurance premiums, and repairs on the mortgaged prop-
41. Id. art 2642, as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1.
42. Id.. art. 3191, as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1.
43. See id. arts. 4034, 4234, 4264, and 4273.
44. Id. arts. 4034, 4234, 4264, and 4273, as amended by La. Acts 1964, No.
4, § 1.
45. Id. arts. 4234 and 4273, as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1.
46. The provisions of id. arts. 4234, 4264, and 4273, as amended, apply equal-
ly to the curatorship of interdicts by virtue of id. art. 4554, as amended by La.
Acts 1962, No. 92, § 1.
47. Under LA. R.S. 6:767 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1954, No. 640, § 1.
48. Under id. 6:835.1, added by La. Acts 1954, No. 713, § 1.
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erty. In such cases, the amount of these advances were proved
by the certificate of the secretary or assistant secretary of the
association. If the same advances were made by other mort-
gagees, even though secured by the mortgage, the latter had to
be enforced via ordinaria, for lack of authentic evidence of the
amount of the advances. In 1964, article 2637 of the Code of
Civil Procedure was amended so as to make it possible for all
such mortgages to be enforced by executory process. The
amount of these advances may now be proved by the verified
petition or by affidavit.49
Another important change in the procedural law was made
through the broadening of the venue for garnishment under
the writ of fieri facias. The prior jurisprudential rule of venue
in such cases only at the domicile of the garnishee had been
retained in the new procedural Code. 50 Because of the increasing
number of corporations, both foreign and domestic, which main-
tained one or more branch establishments in the state, this rule
ceased to be workable when the wages or salary of an employee
of a branch establishment were garnished. In 1964, the venue
was broadened to permit such a garnishment "in the parish
where the garnishee may be sued under Article 42 or 77." 51
Prior to 1964, there was no authority for the use of sum-
mary process in a proceeding against the surety on a judicial
bond, although as a matter of practice the surety seldom chal-
lenged its use. In 1964, the pertinent article of the new pro-
49. The amendment by La. Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1, adds the following para-
graph to this article: "If a mortgage sought to be enforced secures the repayment
of any advances made by the holder of the mortgage note for the payment of
taxes, insurance premiums, or special assessments on, or repairs to, or mainte-
nance of, the property affected by the mortgage, the existence, date, and amount
of these advances may be proved by the verified petition, or supplemental peti-
tion, or by affidavits submitted therewith."
"For these advances to be secured by the mortgage, some limit or ceiling on
them must be provided in the act of mortgage itself. Article 3309, Civil Code.
This amendment does not in any way affect this Civil Code rule, or introduce
any system of 'open end' mortgages into our law. It merely authorizes the en-
forcement, by executory process, of the mortgagee's claim for such advances when
they are secured by a valid mortgage." Comment (c) under LA. CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE art. 2637 (1960), as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1.
50. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2416 (1960).
51. Ibid., as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1.
In the case of a garnishment of the wages or salary of an employee of a cor-
poration's branch establishment, this amendment would permit the garnishment
proceeding to be instituted either in the parish where this branch establishment
was situated or in the parish where its registered office (if a domestic corpora-




cedural Code was amended 2 so as to expressly authorize the
use of summary process in "[a]n action against the surety on
a judicial bond after judgment has been obtained against the
principal, or against both principal and surety when a summary
proceeding against the principal is permitted. ' '53
Two articles relating to succession procedure14 were amended
in 1964, so as to limit the appointment of a stranger as succes-
sion representative to those instances when he has been named
the testamentary executor, is a creditor, or is nominated for
the office by the surviving spouse, a competent heir or legatee,
or by the legal representative of an incompetent heir or legatee,
of the deceased. One of these amendments also grants to the
legal representative of an incompetent heir or legatee of the
deceased the same privilege of nominating the administrator or
dative testamentary executor as is enjoyed by the surviving
spouse and competent heirs and legatees. 5
The remaining amendment of the new procedural Code rec-
ommended by the Law Institute 6 was adopted merely to reduce
court costs through the elimination of unnecessary service of
pleadings in the third party demand. 57
The two amendments of the Code of Civil Procedure not
recommended by the Law Institute are not of great significance.
The first"8 amended the basic forma pauperis article to permit
an indigent wife to enforce an unpaid allowance for alimony or
child support, or both, by a rule for contempt filed without the
prepayment of costs or the furnishing of security therefor. The
52. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2592 (1960), as amended by La. Acts
1964, No. 4, § 1.
53. As in the motion to dissolve a writ of attachment, sequestration, tem-
porary restraining order, or preliminary injunction, and to recover damages for
its illegal issuance. See id. arts. 3506, 3607 and 3608.
54. Id. arts. 3097 and 3098, as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1.
55. Id. art. 3098, as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1.
56. Id. art. 1114, as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1.
57. The original code article required service on the third party defendant of
copies of "the petition in the third party demand; the petition in the principal
demand; the petition in the reconventional demand, if any; and the answers to
the principal and reconventional demand filed prior to the issuance of citation
in the third party action." In many instances the third party defendant is a de-
fendant in the principal action, and occasionally he is the original plaintiff. In
such cases, the service of copies of some of these pleadings is a duplication which
subjects the third party plaintiff to unnecessary court costs. For this reason, the
amended article requires service of copies of these pleadings on the third party
defendant only if they have not previously been served on, or filed by, him. Id.
art. 1114, as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 4, § 1.
58. Id. art. 5181, as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 336, § 1.
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draftsman of this amendment showed commendable restraint
in resisting the professional urge to spiinkle his amendment
with said's and aforesaid's. He succumbed, however, to the
irresistible "and/or.
59
The second of these two amendments" merely limited the
trial judge's authority to fix the hearing on an alternative writ
of mandamus. The amendment provides that any writ of man-
damus "directed to the Bureau of Vital Statistics, city of New
Orleans, or the State Board of Health, shall not be assigned for
a hearing within fifteen days after the service of the writ."
There appears to be no objection to this modification, but, since
it is not a general rule of procedure, it should have been incor-
porated into the Revised Statutes.6'
59. "The classic in the use of this bastard hybrid is La. Acts 1954, No. 731,
§ 1, which authorized the State Board of Institutions 'to provide separate facili-
ties for males and/or females committed to the State Industrial School for Col-
ored Youths.' Apparently, the Christine Jorgensen case was not as unique as the
medical profession thought." PLEADINGS AND JUDICIAL FoaMs ANNOTATED, 10
LSA-CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE vi, n. 4 (1963).
60. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3782 (1960), as amended by La. Acts
1964, No. 483, § 1.
61. As a new section 88 of Title 40.
1964]
